Monetary policy efficacy depends largely on how it affects bank behavior. Recent events have cast doubt on how well monetary policy works in this regard, particularly during financial crises. Questions have also been raised about the role of banks in creating asset bubbles that burst and lead to crises. We address these issues by focusing on bank liquidity creation, a comprehensive measure of bank output that accounts for all on-and off-balance sheet activities. We find that: (1) during normal times, monetary policy affects liquidity creation only for small banks; (2) monetary policy effects are weaker for banks of all sizes during financial crises; (3) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) helps predict future crises after controlling for other factors. † The existing literature provides some evidence on the effect of monetary policy on banks' on-balance sheet activities during normal times. The bank lending channel literature finds monetary policy to be effective for small banks that lack significant access to non-deposit sources of funds, but less so for large banks (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). The effect of monetary policy on banks' on-balance sheet activities during financial crises has not been investigated, nor has the effect on off-balance sheet activities during either normal times or financial crises.
Bank Liquidity Creation, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crises
According to financial intermediation theory, the creation of liquidity is a key reason why banks exist.
1 Banks create liquidity on the balance sheet by financing relatively illiquid assets such as business loans with relatively liquid liabilities such as transactions deposits (e.g., Bryant 1980, Diamond and Dybvig 1983) , and off the balance sheet through loan commitments and similar claims to liquid funds (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole 1998, Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 2002) . 2 Bank liquidity creation is important for the macroeconomy (e.g., Bernanke 1983, Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan 2008) , and its prominence is typically heightened during financial crises (e.g., Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer 2009) . For example, in the recent subprime lending crisis, liquidity seemed to dry up for a time, with severe consequences for the real sector.
To ameliorate liquidity concerns and to stimulate the economy, monetary policy is typically loosened during financial crises. However, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out in the narrower context of bank lending, such monetary policy initiatives will only work if banks indeed extend more loans or -more generally -create more liquidity, something that banks may not do in some circumstances. This means understanding the response of banks to monetary policy initiatives during crises is crucial. One impediment to developing such an understanding is that there is virtually no empirical evidence on the effectiveness of monetary policy in affecting bank liquidity creation during either normal times or crises. This is perhaps because empirical measures of bank liquidity creation have been lacking until recently.
The existing literature provides some evidence on the effect of monetary policy on banks'
on-balance sheet activities during normal times. The bank lending channel literature finds monetary policy to be effective for small banks that lack significant access to non-deposit sources of funds, but less so for large banks (Kashyap and Stein, 2000) . The effect of monetary policy on banks' on-balance sheet activities during financial crises has not been investigated, nor has the effect on off-balance sheet activities during either normal times or financial crises.
A further intriguing possibility is raised by the fact that bank liquidity creation and the probability of the occurrence of a crisis may not be unrelated. Two papers have touched upon this issue in the context of on-balance sheet liquidity creation. Diamond and Rajan (2001) suggest that fragility is needed to create liquidity, which suggests that failures of individually fragile banks are more likely to occur precisely when these banks are creating high amounts of liquidity. Acharya and Naqvi (2012) argue that banks that create substantial liquidity may also pursue lending policies that generate asset price bubbles and thereby increase the fragility of the banking sector.
The argument extends in a somewhat different way to off-balance-sheet liquidity creation. Thakor (2005) shows that excessive risk-taking and greater bank liquidity creation may occur off the balance sheet during economic booms, as banks shy away from exercising material adverse change clauses due to reputational concerns during such times. While all these papers model risk and liquidity creation at the individual bank level, recent papers have shown that liquidity creation facilitated by fragility-inducing mechanisms like leverage may involve banks making correlated asset portfolio choices when leverage is high (Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor 2010, Farhi and Tirole forthcoming). Such correlated choices can induce systemic risk and increase the probability of a systemwide crisis. Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (forthcoming) argue that models that assess systemic risk should include liquidity build-ups in the financial sector.
To understand these issues more deeply, we address three questions that are motivated by the above discussion. First, how does monetary policy affect total bank liquidity creation and its two main components, on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet liquidity creation, during normal times? Our focus on bank liquidity creation, which takes into account all on-and off-balance sheet activities, is a departure from the existing literature which has typically focused on two onbalance sheet activities, lending and deposits. According to the bank lending channel literature, monetary policy may affect bank lending and deposits (for survey papers on this, see Gertler 1995, Kashyap and Stein 1997) , but this literature has paid less attention to the fact that monetary policy may also affect off-balance sheet activities like loan commitments (e.g., Woodford 1996 , Morgan 1998 , given that these are present commitments to lend in the future.
Second, does monetary policy affect bank liquidity creation differently during financial crises versus normal times? It is intuitive that during financial crises, monetary policy would generate an effect that is different than during other times because banks may hoard loanable funds and be less responsive to incentives to lend during financial crises (Diamond and Rajan 2011, Caballero and Simsek 2013) . Also, the demand for and supply of loan commitments and other off-balance sheet guarantees may be affected during financial crises (e.g., Thakor 2005 ).
Third, does the level of aggregate bank liquidity creation provide an indication of an impending crisis? This follows directly from our earlier discussion of the posited theoretical link between fragility and liquidity creation at the bank and systemwide level.
We formulate and test hypotheses related to these questions using data on virtually all banks in the U.S. from 1984:Q1-2008:Q4. The sample period includes five financial crises: 1) the 1987 stock market crash; 2) the credit crunch of the early 1990s; 3) the Russian debt crisis plus the Long-Term Capital Management meltdown in 1998; 4) the bursting of the dot.com bubble plus the September 11 terrorist attack of the early 2000s; and 5) the subprime lending crisis of the late 2000s. Our main analyses consider these crises collectively. A key strength of our approach is that we try to generalize across crises so that our results might be more predictive of the effects of monetary policy during future crises, the type of which is unknowable in advance. However, recognizing that differences across these crises exist, we also split them into crises that originated in the banking sector (2 and 5 above) and crises that originated in the financial market (1, 3, and 4), and find the results to be robust.
To examine the effect of monetary policy on liquidity creation, we use both a vector autoregression (VAR) model and a single-equation approach in the spirit of Romer and Romer (2004) . The VAR model may be more appropriate if monetary policy responds significantly to bank liquidity creation, while the single-equation approach may be more suitable if monetary policy is essentially exogenous to bank liquidity creation. To account for both possibilities, we run the model both ways. As shown below, we obtain qualitatively similar results using both approaches. 3 We focus on changes in monetary policy based on two measures -the change in the federal funds rate and Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shocks. The change in the federal funds rate measures the change in monetary policy because the Federal Reserve explicitly targeted the federal funds rate over our entire sample period. A drawback of this measure, however, is that it may contain anticipatory movements. That is, movements in the federal funds rate may respond to information about future developments in the economy, making it harder to isolate the effect of monetary policy on bank output. The monetary policy shock measure developed in Romer and Romer (2004) takes such endogeneity into account.
The amount of liquidity created by the banking sector is calculated using Berger and Bouwman's (2009) preferred liquidity creation measure, which has been subsequently used in a number of studies (e.g., Distinguin, Roulet, and Tarazi, 2013; Horvath, Seidler, and Weill, 2014) .
We verify that similar results are obtained using an alternative liquidity creation measure that takes into account changes in banks' ability to securitize over time. Since the effects of monetary policy on liquidity creation are expected to differ by size class, in most analyses, bank liquidity creation is split into liquidity created by small banks (gross total assets or GTA 4 up to $1 billion), medium banks (GTA exceeding $1 billion and up to $3 billion), and large banks (GTA exceeding $3 billion). In some analyses, liquidity creation is also split into liquidity created on versus off the balance sheet.
Our main findings, which generally support our hypotheses, are as follows. First, during normal times, monetary policy loosening (tightening) is associated with a statistically significant increase (decrease) in liquidity creation by small banks, driven largely by the impact on onbalance sheet liquidity creation, although this effect is economically small. Monetary policy does not seem to have a significant effect on total liquidity creation by medium and large banks, which create roughly 90% of aggregate bank liquidity, although the effects on-and off-balance sheet liquidity creation by these banks are sometimes significant. Our stronger results for small banks is consistent with the literature that uses bank lending rather than bank liquidity creation (e.g.,
Kashyap and Stein 2000).
Second, the efficacy of monetary policy declines during financial crises. For banks of all sizes, the effect of monetary policy is statistically significantly weaker relative to its intent during financial crises than during normal times and this is economically significant for large banks.
These results are driven by the response of both on-and off-balance sheet liquidity creation to monetary policy.
Third, financial crises are preceded by levels of liquidity creation that tend to be high relative to a time trend, suggesting that abnormally high liquidity creation may be a harbinger of a crisis. We find the level of detrended liquidity creation to have incremental explanatory power in predicting crises even after controlling for other macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth, monetary policy, and stock market returns. These results are driven primarily by off-balance sheet liquidity creation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses.
Section 3 briefly describes the five financial crises, 5 explains the monetary policy and liquidity creation measures, discusses our sample, and presents summary statistics. Section 4 analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and bank liquidity creation during normal times and financial crises. Section 5 examines whether high liquidity creation is an indicator of an impending crisis. Section 6 concludes.
Development of the Hypotheses
This section formulates three hypotheses related to the questions raised in the Introduction. To motivate our hypotheses, we discuss demand-side and supply-side channels. Our data do not allow us to distinguish between these two channels. Fortunately, to test our hypotheses it is not important to disentangle the two effects --it is sufficient to examine the net effect of monetary policy on liquidity creation.
Hypothesis related to the first question
Hypothesis 1: During normal times, monetary policy loosening (MPL) will: (a) increase onbalance sheet liquidity creation for banks of all sizes and this effect will be strongest for small banks; (b) have an ambiguous effect on off-balance sheet liquidity creation for banks of all sizes;
and (c) increase total liquidity creation by small banks, but the effect on medium and large banks will be ambiguous.
Motivation:
Monetary policy will affect on-and off-balance sheet liquidity creation differently during normal times. For ease of exposition we focus on MPL (loosening), but note that, in line with the literature, we assume symmetry -the opposite effects are expected to occur for MPT (tightening).
On-balance sheet liquidity creation: MPL is expected to increase on-balance sheet liquidity creation through the bank lending channel by increasing both deposits and loans (see survey papers by Gertler 1995, Kashyap and Stein 1997) . To elaborate, MPL is expected to expand bank reserves, which may cause an increase in bank deposits. This may expand the loanable funds available and/or decrease the cost of funds by replacing higher-cost sources such as federal funds or large CDs with cheaper deposits (e.g., Blinder 1992, Stein 1998 ).
Banks may respond by lending more, including granting credit to some loan applicants that might otherwise be rationed (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) . 6 The effect is expected to be greater for small banks because they have less access to non-deposit sources of funds (Kashyap and Stein 2000) .
Off-balance sheet liquidity creation: The effect of MPL on off-balance sheet liquidity creation is ambiguous for banks of all size classes. On the one hand, customers who obtain more credit in the spot market may reduce their demand for loan commitments and other off-balance sheet guarantees (Thakor 2005) . On the other hand, banks may supply more guarantees in reaction to MPL because of the greater availability of loanable funds and/or a reduction in the cost of these funds. 7 It is unclear ex ante which effect dominates.
Total liquidity creation: The effect of MPL on total liquidity creation by small banks is hypothesized to be positive. The positive effect of MPL on on-balance sheet liquidity creation is expected to dominate the ambiguous effect on off-balance sheet liquidity creation because these banks create the vast majority of their liquidity on the balance sheet (see Berger and Bouwman 2009 ). In contrast, medium and large banks create sizeable fractions of their liquidity off the balance sheet. Therefore, the ambiguous effect on off-balance sheet liquidity creation may dominate the positive effect on on-balance sheet liquidity creation, causing the effect of MPL on total liquidity creation by medium and large banks to be ambiguous.
Hypothesis related to the second question
Hypothesis 2: The effect of monetary policy on liquidity creation is weaker during crises than during normal times for banks of all size classes. This will hold for: (a) on-balance sheet liquidity creation; (b) off-balance sheet liquidity creation; and (c) total liquidity creation.
6 Additionally, a decrease in market interest rates caused by MPL increases the present value of fixed-rate loans in a bank's portfolio, which improves the bank's net worth, thereby also enhancing bank credit supply. 7 In addition, since there are complementarities between offering deposits and selling loan commitments, an increase in deposits can also induce the bank to provide more liquidity to its customers via loan commitments (see Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 2002) .
Motivation:
Monetary policy will affect on-and off-balance sheet liquidity creation differently during crises. Again, we focus our discussion on MPL (loosening), but note that the opposite effects are expected to occur for MPT (tightening).
On-balance sheet liquidity creation: During a crisis, monetary policy is generally loosened to stimulate bank lending and hence on-balance sheet liquidity creation. However, the response of on-balance sheet liquidity creation to monetary policy loosening may be muted relative to what it would be during normal times because during crises banks may hoard loanable funds and be less responsive to incentives to lend. This could cause banks to not be willing to deploy the additional liquidity made available by MPL to increase lending very much. Problems of asymmetric information also typically become more acute during crises and the possibility of asset markets freezing up can also make banks more averse to taking positions in some assets or engaging in interbank lending that, in turn, could have enabled other banks to make loans (Diamond and Rajan
2011, Caballero and Simsek 2013).
Off-balance sheet liquidity creation: The effect of monetary policy on off-balance sheet liquidity creation is also weaker during crises. During normal times, MPL facilitates an increase in the supply of spot loans, and as a result, the demand for loan commitments and other offbalance sheet guarantees goes down. At the same time, the supply of such guarantees may go up since banks have more access to funds at possibly cheaper rates. Thus, MPL results in an ambiguous overall effect during normal times, as discussed above. During crises, the reduction in demand for these off-balance sheet guarantees due to MPL is smaller because there is more rationing in the spot market due to greater asymmetric information and moral hazard frictions (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) , so some borrowers who would have gone to the spot market shift instead to loan commitments (Thakor 2005) . Similarly, banks may increase the supply of these guarantees less in response to MPL during crises because they are less responsive to changes in loanable funds and the cost of funding during crises. Consequently, since MPL is predicted to have an ambiguous effect on off-balance sheet liquidity creation during normal times, it will have a smaller positive effect or a stronger negative effect during crises. For ease of exposition, we refer to this as a weaker effect (smaller movement in the intended direction).
Total liquidity creation: The effect of MPL on total liquidity creation is the sum of these two effects. Since both effects are weaker during crises than during normal times, the overall effect is also weaker. Our main analysis aggregates the data across these five crises. Recognizing that crises are heterogeneous, as a robustness check, we also split the data into banking crises versus market crises based on whether a crisis originated in the banking sector or in the financial market. 9 Using this method, crises (2) and (5) are classified as banking crises, and crises (1), (3), and (4) are identified as market crises.
Hypothesis related to the third question

Two monetary policy measures
To examine how monetary policy affects liquidity creation, we focus on the change in monetary policy based on two measures. These are the change in the federal funds rate and the monetary policy shocks developed by Romer and Romer (2004) .
Since the Federal Reserve explicitly targeted the federal funds rate over our entire sample period, the change in the federal funds rate measures the change in monetary policy.
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A drawback of this measure, however, is that it may contain anticipatory movements. measures is the following. When the federal funds rate is reduced, it will always be recorded as MPL based on the change in the federal funds rate. However, it will only be recorded as MPL based on the Romer and Romer policy shocks if the reduction in the federal funds rate was more than it normally would be based on the Federal Reserve's internal forecasts of inflation and growth. Conversely, an increase in the federal funds rate will always be recorded as MPT based on the change in the federal funds measure, but will be recorded as MPL based on the Romer and Romer policy shock measure only if the increase was less than expected.
Bank liquidity creation: preferred and alternative measures
To construct a measure of liquidity creation, we follow Berger and Bouwman's (2009) three-step procedure which is shown in Table 1 . Below, we briefly discuss these three steps.
In
Step 1, we classify all bank activities (assets, liabilities, equity, and off-balance sheet activities) as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid. For assets, this is based on the ease, cost, and time for banks to dispose of their obligations in order to meet these liquidity demands. For liabilities and equity, this is based on the ease, cost, and time for customers to obtain liquid funds from the bank.
We follow a similar approach for off-balance sheet activities, classifying them based on functionally similar on-balance sheet activities. For all activities other than loans, this classification process uses information on both product category and maturity. Due to data restrictions, we classify loans entirely by category.
Step 2, we assign weights to all the bank activities classified in Step 1. The weights are consistent with liquidity creation theory, which argues that banks create liquidity on the balance sheet when they transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. We therefore apply positive weights to illiquid assets and liquid liabilities. Following similar logic, we apply negative weights to liquid assets and illiquid liabilities and equity, since banks destroy liquidity when they use illiquid liabilities to finance liquid assets. We use weights of ½ and -½, because only half of the total amount of liquidity created is attributable to the source or use of funds alone. For example, when $1 of liquid liabilities is used to finance $1 in illiquid assets, liquidity creation equals ½ * $1 + ½ * $1 = $1. In this case, maximum liquidity is created. However, when $1 of liquid liabilities is used to finance $1 in liquid assets, liquidity creation equals ½ * $1 + -½ * $1 = $0. In this case, no liquidity is created as the bank holds items of approximately the same liquidity as those it gives to the nonbank public. Maximum liquidity is destroyed when $1 of illiquid liabilities or equity is used to finance $1 of liquid assets. In this case, liquidity creation equals -½ * $1 + -½ * $1 = -$1.
An intermediate weight of 0 is applied to semi-liquid assets and liabilities. Weights for offbalance sheet activities are assigned using the same principles.
Step 3, we combine the activities as classified in
Step 1 and as weighted in Step 2 to construct Berger and Bouwman's (2009) preferred liquidity creation measure. This measure classifies loans by category, while all activities other than loans are classified using information on product category and maturity, and includes off-balance sheet activities. 12 To obtain the dollar amount of liquidity creation at a particular bank, we multiply the weights of ½, -½, or 0, respectively, times the dollar amounts of the corresponding bank activities and add the weighted dollar amounts.
Since the ability to securitize assets has changed greatly over time, we also construct an alternative liquidity creation measure as in Berger and Bouwman (2009) . This measure is identical to the preferred measure, except for the way we classify loans. For each loan category, we use U.S. Flow of Funds data on the total amount of loans outstanding and the total amount of loans securitized to calculate the fraction of loans that has been securitized in the market at each point in time. Following Loutskina (2011), we then assume that each bank can securitize that fraction of its own loans. To give an example, in 1993:Q4, $3.1 trillion in residential real estate loans were outstanding in the market, and 48.4% of these loans were securitized. If a bank has $10 million in residential real estate loans in that quarter, we assume that 48.4% of it can be securitized. Hence, we classify $4.84 million of these loans as semi-liquid and the remainder as illiquid. Note that this alternative measure faces a significant drawback. While the theories suggest that it is the ability to securitize that matters for liquidity creation, this measure uses the actual amount of securitization. Thus, while the vast majority of these residential real estate loans may be securitizable, this alternative measure treats only about half of them as such.
We provide descriptive statistics on the preferred and the alternative liquidity creation measures in Section 3.5. Since we obtain qualitatively similar regression results based on the alternative measure, all reported regression results are based on the preferred measure for brevity.
Sample description
We include virtually all commercial and credit card banks in the U.S. in our study. 13 For each bank, we obtain quarterly Call Report data from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q4. As noted in Section 3.1, we stop the data in 2008:Q4 because the Federal Reserve changed its operating procedures. We keep a bank in the sample if it: 1) has commercial real estate or commercial and industrial loans outstanding; 2) has deposits; 3) has gross total assets or GTA exceeding $25 million; 4) has an equity capital to GTA ratio of at least 1%.
For each bank, we calculate the dollar amount of liquidity creation in each quarter (933,209 bank-quarter observations from 18,294 distinct banks) using the process described in Section 3.3. We aggregate these amounts to obtain the dollar amount of liquidity creation by the banking sector, and put these (and all other financial values) into real 2008:Q4 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator. We thus end up with a final sample that contains 100 inflationadjusted, quarterly liquidity creation amounts.
Since the hypothesized effects of monetary policy on liquidity creation differ by bank size,
we also split the sample into small, medium, and large banks, and perform our analyses separately for these three sets of banks. Small banks have gross total assets (GTA) up to $1 billion, medium banks have GTA exceeding $1 billion and up to $3 billion, and large banks have GTA exceeding $3 billion. Small banks correspond to the usual definition of community banks and the $3 billion cutoff between medium and large banks results in approximately equal numbers of banks in those two size classes. Over this same time frame, the shares of medium and small banks dropped from 8% to 5% and from 16% to 9%, respectively. Using the alternative measure, their shares dropped from 9% to 4% and from 21% to 8%, respectively (not shown for brevity).
Bank liquidity creation summary statistics
The effect of monetary policy on bank liquidity creation during normal times and financial crises
This section focuses on testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. We first discuss our methodology and explain why we use regression analysis in the spirit of Romer and Romer (2004) and a vector autoregression (VAR) setup (Section 4.1). We then present regression results for total liquidity creation (Section 4.2), and on-versus off-balance sheet liquidity creation (Section 4.3). Finally, we briefly discuss a robustness check in which we split the crises into banking versus market crises and rerun all of the regressions (Section 4.4).
Monetary policy and bank liquidity creation -methodology
To examine the effect of monetary policy on liquidity creation, we use both a vector policy is less effective during financial crises than during normal times as hypothesized, the coefficients on the interaction term will be positive and significant.
Note that even in this single-equation approach, the effects of monetary policy on liquidity creation over time are complicated because of the lags of liquidity creation in equation (1). For example, the predicted effect of a monetary policy shock two quarters ago on the percentage change in liquidity creation in the current quarter will have a direct effect through the coefficient of the second lag of ΔMONPOL plus a feedback effect through the effect on the first lag of %ΔLC, which also affects current %ΔLC. Thus, while the predicted effect of a monetary policy shock one quarter ago on liquidity creation in the current quarter during normal times (i.e., when lagged D CRIS = 0) is simply β 1 , the predicted effect of ΔMONPOL t-2 on %ΔLC t is given by β 2 + β 1 γ 1 .
Similarly, the one-and two-quarter impulse response functions when the lagged quarters are during financial crises (i.e., lagged D CRIS = 1) are β 1 + θ 1 and β 2 + θ 2 + (β 1 + θ 1 )γ 1 , respectively.
The differential crisis effects are simply the difference between the crisis and normal times effects, 
(2) 
The variables are as explained above. Equation (2) replicates equation (1) from the singleequation approach, and equations (3) and (4) Romer and Romer 2004; Stock and Watson 2001) . At the 95% level, we find less significance than reported, while at the 68% level, we find more. 23 One notable exception is that for large banks, the single-equation approach yields a small positive, significant effect for large banks after four quarters (based on a change in the federal funds rate), indicating that the effect of monetary policy might go in the opposite way of intentions for these banks during normal times.
will increase total liquidity creation by small banks, but will have an ambiguous effect on medium and large banks.
Our normal-times results are consistent with Kashyap and Stein (2000) , who examine the effect of monetary policy on individual banks' lending. First, like us, they find that monetary policy affects small banks most. Second, they also find that (small) banks react within one to two quarters to changes in monetary policy, with the effect dying out shortly thereafter. It is interesting to note that monetary policy affects bank behavior far more quickly (if at all) than it affects GDP and other non-bank variables typically studied in the macro literature (e.g., To gauge the economic significance of the results, we focus on the change in the federal funds rate because they are easier to interpret, but note that the results based on the Romer and Romer policy shocks are similar. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the VAR model. We discuss the small-bank results first. The statistically significant impulse responses of the change in the federal funds rate of -0.022, -0.016, and -0.013 after one to three quarters (top left picture in Figure 3 Panel A) suggest that if the federal funds rate decreases by one percentage point, the cumulative increase in liquidity creation by small banks is 2.2%, 1.6%, and 1.3% after one, two, and three quarters, respectively. Evaluated at the average dollar amount of liquidity created by small banks of $333 billion, this translates into a cumulative increase in liquidity creation of $7.49 billion, $5.43 billion, and $4.34 billion after one, two, and three quarters, respectively. Thus, while the effect of monetary policy on liquidity creation by small banks is statistically significant during normal times, the magnitudes are relatively small from an economic viewpoint. The differential crisis effect for small banks is positive in all cases using the federal funds rate but not statistically significant, so we do not evaluate its economic significance.
We next discuss the economic significance of the results for medium and large banks. For these banks, the effects of monetary policy are not significant during normal times. However, the differential crisis effect is positive and statistically significant in two cases: after three quarters for medium banks and after two quarters for large banks. As discussed above, a positive impulse response implies a weaker effect of monetary policy during a crisis. We now quantify this weaker effect. The respective impulse responses of 0.044 and 0.024 suggest that if the federal funds rate decreases by one percentage point during crises, the decrease in liquidity creation by these banks relative to normal times is 4.4% and 2.4%, respectively. Evaluated at the average amount of liquidity created by medium and large banks of $175 billion and $2,609 billion, respectively, this translates into a decrease in liquidity creation relative to normal times of $7.77 billion and $61.41 billion after three and two quarters, respectively. Thus, while we do not find overwhelming statistical significance for medium and large banks, the economic significance of the effect appears to be sizeable for large banks. To examine how monetary policy affects on-and off-balance sheet liquidity creation during normal times (Hypothesis 1 Parts (a) and (b)), we focus on the top rows in Figure 5 Panels
I-A, I-B, II-A and II-B.
We first consider small banks. As discussed above, monetary policy is generally statistically significant for these banks during normal times. The results in Figure 5 provide strong evidence that this is largely driven by the effect of monetary policy on on-balance sheet liquidity creation. Specifically, MPL increases on-balance sheet liquidity creation of small banks, 24 but generally does not have a significant effect on off-balance sheet liquidity creation of these banks. 25 Next, we consider medium and large banks. We discussed above that monetary policy is not effective for these banks during normal times. Despite this, the results in Figure 5 provide some evidence that MPL increases the on-balance sheet liquidity created by medium and large banks, 26 and off-balance sheet liquidity creation by large banks during normal times.
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These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 Parts (a) and (b), which states that MPL will increase on-balance sheet liquidity creation and this effect will be stronger for smaller banks, and will have an ambiguous effect on off-balance sheet liquidity creation for banks of all sizes.
We now investigate whether our earlier result that monetary policy is generally less effective during financial crises is driven by a weaker effect on either or both on-and off-balance 
Robustness check: banking crises versus market crises
As indicated above, a key strength of our approach is that we try to generalize across crises so that our results might be more predictive of the effects of monetary policy during future crises, the type 24 Significance for several lags based on both monetary policy measures -see the top left pictures in Figure 5 Panels I-A and I-B. 25 The effect is generally negative but never significant based on the federal funds rate and only significant after two quarters based on the Romer and Romer monetary policy shock measure -see the top left pictures in Our main results suggested that during financial crises, monetary policy has a weaker effect on liquidity creation. We now find that these results -especially for small and medium banks -seem to be driven by the weaker effects of monetary policy during both banking and market crises. 30 This indicates that aggregating across banking and market crises in our main analysis did not qualitatively affect our conclusions and validates our combining of both sets of crises.
30 For large banks, the weaker effects tend to be manifested more during market crises.
Is high liquidity creation an indicator of an impending crisis?
This section analyzes whether high liquidity creation is an indicator of an impending crisis (Hypothesis 3). It first provides graphical evidence which suggests that liquidity creation (in particular its off-balance sheet component) tends to be abnormally high relative to a trend line before crises. It then proceeds to formally examine whether the level of liquidity creation predicts the probability of occurrence of a crisis.
The analysis presented in this section is based on deseasonalized and detrended data. The next subsection explains why.
Detrended bank liquidity creation
As shown in Section 3.5, liquidity creation has grown dramatically over time. It is also likely that it contains seasonal components. This poses a problem because any analysis that tries to examine whether high levels of liquidity creation precede financial crises would be strongly affected by the long-run trend (and possibly the seasonal components). What we are interested in are deviations from the trend. To link liquidity creation to the advent of a crisis, we therefore use an approach widely used in the macroeconomics literature (e.g., Barro 1997): we first deseasonalize and then detrend the data.
To deseasonalize the data, we use the prominent X11 procedure developed by the U.S.
Census Bureau. This procedure identifies and adjusts for outliers. For detrending, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) (HP) filter. 31 Henceforth, we call deseasonalized and detrended data "detrended data" for brevity.
A naïve approach would be to simply take data over our entire sample period and detrend it. However, such an approach is subject to criticism since the detrended amounts are based on (varying degrees of) forward-looking data. While the detrended amount in the last quarter would be based on historical data, the detrended amount in the first quarter would be based on future data. This may not be problematic if our only goal is to show that detrended liquidity creation is high before crises. However, we also want to see if we can predict future crises. For such an analysis, it is paramount that the detrended data are not based on forward-looking data.
To ensure that the quarterly detrended amounts used in this paper are based purely on historical data, we use the following approach. Since the HP filter requires that at least twelve quarterly observations are used, we first detrend the initial twelve quarters in the sample period (1984:Q1-1986:Q4) . We drop the first eleven quarterly detrended amounts since they are in part based on forward-looking data. Thus, the first detrended amount in our analyses is from the twelfth quarter, 1986:Q4. To obtain the detrended amount in next quarter, we use data from 1984:Q1-1987:Q1 in our detrending process and only keep the result for 1987:Q1. We follow a similar procedure for every subsequent quarter and end up with a detrended liquidity creation series from 1986:Q4 -2008:Q4 that is based on historical data in every quarter. We repeat the procedure to obtain detrended on-and off-balance sheet liquidity creation series over the same time period.
Is liquidity creation high (relative to trend) before crises?
Figure 6 These graphs provide some initial support for the hypothesis that high (detrended) liquidity creation precedes crises. This seems to be driven by off-balance sheet liquidity creation.
Is high liquidity creation (relative to trend) an indicator of an impending crisis? (Hypothesis 3)
We now formally examine whether abnormally high detrended liquidity creation presages a 32 Detrended liquidity creation peaked in 2006:Q2, then dropped for three quarters afterward (until 2007:Q1) . It rose dramatically in 2007:Q2. Importantly, as discussed in Section 5.3, the predictability of crises is driven by the level of detrended liquidity creation (which was high even after it dropped). financial crisis as predicted by Hypothesis 3. To investigate this, we perform out-of-sample predictions in which we link the level of detrended liquidity creation with the probability of occurrence of a crisis. To predict the onset of a crisis, we keep the normal time period quarters and the first quarter of each crisis (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2001). We drop the remaining crisis quarters because a crisis cannot start if one is already underway. As a result, the sample used here is smaller than the one used above. A dummy is created that equals 1 during the first quarter of each crisis and 0 otherwise.
One possible way to examine this issue would be to use a hazard model. The finance literature has used hazard models to predict a variety of "failures," such as companies going bankrupt (e.g., Shumway 2001). However, in our context, using a hazard model to predict crises is inappropriate. The reason is that hazard models adjust for an age effect. That is, they assume that the time that has elapsed since the last failure matters in determining the probability of occurrence of the next failure. This assumption is not economically justifiable in our context since a financial crisis can happen at any time, and the time since the last crisis occurred is not an economically sensible variable on which one can condition the probability of occurrence of the next crisis. We therefore predict crises using logit models instead.
Ideally, we would like to use data from a sample period that contains a large number of crises, obtain the regression coefficients, and use them to predict the advent of several subsequent crises. Unfortunately, our sample period includes only five crises. The models we use to obtain the regression coefficients therefore always include the first four crises and our focus is on predicting the start of the next crisis.
To predict the start of the fifth crisis, it is important to only use historical data. For this purpose, we run 19 logit regressions each of which adds one additional quarter of data. The first logit regression uses data through 2002:Q4, one quarter after the end of the fourth crisis. At this point in time, it is reasonable to assume that the start of the first four crises is generally known and thus could be used as historical data in a forecasting model. We therefore regress the log odds ratio of a crisis striking on (lagged) detrended total liquidity creation and various (lagged) macroeconomic variables discussed below which may help predict the start of a crisis. The coefficients from this regression are used to predict the probability of a crisis occurring one 
where DETRENDED LC is detrended liquidity creation, DETRENDED GDP is detrended GDP, MONPOL is monetary policy measured as the level of the federal funds rate, and MKTRETURN is the performance of the stock market as proxied by the average quarterly return on the valueweighted CRSP index.
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Note that Hypothesis 3 is phrased in terms of the level of liquidity creation rather than the change. When liquidity creation is high for a number of periods, a crisis may be likely to strike even if liquidity creation is not increasing. For consistency, the other variables are expressed in levels as well. 35 This is why we use the level of the federal funds rate in this analysis and not the Romer and Romer policy shocks, which measure changes in monetary policy. shows that the odds ratios of detrended liquidity creation exceed 1 in all cases and are significant at the 10% level in 18 out of 19 cases. These results suggest that a higher level of detrended liquidity creation is associated with a higher risk of a crisis striking one quarter hence. The percentage change in the odds of a crisis striking can be calculated as 100 * (odds ratio -1). Thus, the odds ratios of about 1.03 for DETRENDED LC TOTAL t-1 in almost all the models suggest that a $1 billion increase in detrended liquidity creation increases the odds of a crisis occurring one quarter hence by about 3.0%. The odds ratios for detrended GDP are smaller than 1 in all cases and always significant, suggesting that a higher level of detrended GDP reduces the probability of a crisis striking. The odds ratios for monetary policy is positive and in many cases marginally significant, suggesting that a higher federal funds rate is associated with a higher probability of a 33 We also tried including four lags of every regression variable, but there were not enough observations to support this specification (half of the regression variables dropped out). 34 Regressions based on the equal-weighted CRSP index or the S&P 500 yield similar results. 35 As an exception, we include market returns rather than the level of the stock market.
crisis occurring. 36 The odds ratios for the return on the stock market are never significant. These results suggest that detrended liquidity creation has explanatory power even after including detrended GDP, the federal funds rate, and the return on the market. Table 2 Panel B interprets our findings using the predicted probabilities of a crisis occurring one quarter hence starting in 2002:Q4 (the first quarter after the fourth crisis) and ending in 2007:Q2 (one quarter before the fifth crisis). The results clearly show that the probability of a crisis striking was close to zero soon after the fourth crisis was over, but started to increase in 2005:Q4. As of the end of 2006:Q3, the probability of a crisis occurring in the next quarter was close to 25%. Two quarters before the subprime lending crisis started, the probability of a crisis striking had increased to over 90%, although this dropped to 33% the quarter before the crisis.
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These results clearly suggest that high total liquidity creation relative to trend presages a crisis. This supports Hypothesis 3. We also run two additional sets of 19 logit regressions based on detrended on-and off-balance sheet liquidity creation to examine whether our findings in support of this hypothesis are driven by on-balance sheet liquidity creation, off-balance sheet liquidity creation, or both. Our analyses suggest that the results are driven primarily by offbalance sheet liquidity creation (not shown for brevity).
Conclusions
This paper formulates and empirically tests hypotheses regarding the effect of monetary policy on bank liquidity creation during normal times, whether the effect is different during financial crises versus normal times, and whether the amount of liquidity created by the banking sector at any estimated, and the results are broadly consistent between these models. We distinguish between banks based on size, since we anticipate that the effect of monetary policy on banks will be sizedependent. Our main findings are as follows.
First, during normal times, monetary policy has a statistically significant effect on liquidity creation by small banks in that a loosening (tightening) of monetary policy is associated with an increase (a reduction) in liquidity creation by these banks, but this effect is economically small.
This result is primarily driven by the response of on-balance sheet liquidity creation to monetary policy. During normal times, monetary policy does not seem to have a significant effect on total liquidity creation by medium and large banks.
Second, for banks of all sizes, the effect of monetary policy is weaker during financial crises than during normal times. These results are driven by the responses of both on-and offbalance sheet liquidity creation to monetary policy.
Third, liquidity creation tends to be high (relative to trend) prior to financial crises, pointing to the possibility that the amount of liquidity created by banks can be a predictor of an impending crisis. Its level has incremental explanatory power in predicting crises even after controlling for various other macroeconomic factors. These results are driven primarily by offbalance sheet liquidity creation.
Our results raise interesting questions for future research. For example, should policy makers consider instruments other than changing the federal funds rate to affect the behavior of medium and large banks, especially during financial crises? Is there a "socially optimal" level of aggregate liquidity creation? If so, is it possible to engage in calibration exercises that can help regulators to determine when the social optimum has been exceeded and the banking sector needs to be reined in? These are difficult questions, but addressing them has great policy relevance.
This Appendix describes the five financial crises that occurred in the U.S. between 1984:Q1 and 2008:Q4.
Financial crisis #1: Stock market crash (1987:Q4)
On Monday, October 19, 1987, the stock market crashed, with the S&P500 index falling about 20%. During the years before the crash, the level of the stock market had increased dramatically, causing some concern that the market had become overvalued. 38 A few days before the crash, two events occurred that may have helped precipitate the crash: 1) legislation was enacted to eliminate certain tax benefits associated with financing mergers; and 2) information was released that the trade deficit was above expectations. Both events seemed to have added to the selling pressure and a record trading volume on Oct. 19, in part caused by program trading, overwhelmed many systems.
Financial crisis #2: Credit crunch (1990:Q1 -1992:Q4)
During the first three years of the 1990s, bank commercial and industrial lending declined in real terms, particularly for small banks and for small loans (see Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995, Table 8 , for details). The ascribed causes of the credit crunch include a fall in bank capital from the loan loss experiences of the late 1980s (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 1995), the increases in bank leverage requirements and implementation of Basel I risk-based capital standards during this time period (e.g., Berger and Udell 1994 , Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox 1995 , Thakor 1996 , an increase in supervisory toughness evidenced in worse examination ratings for a given bank condition (e.g.,
Berger, Kyle, and Scalise 2001), and reduced loan demand because of macroeconomic and regional recessions (e.g., Bernanke and Lown 1991) . The existing research provides some support for each of these hypotheses.
Financial crisis #3: Russian debt crisis / LTCM bailout (1998:Q3 -1998:Q4)
Since its inception in March 1994, hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management ("LTCM")
followed an arbitrage strategy that was avowedly "market neutral," designed to make money regardless of whether prices were rising or falling. When Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt on August 17, 1998, investors fled from other government paper to the safe haven of U.S.
treasuries. This flight to liquidity caused an unexpected widening of spreads on supposedly lowrisk portfolios. By the end of August 1998, LTCM's capital had dropped to $2.3 billion, less than 50% of its December 1997 value, with assets standing at $126 billion. In the first three weeks of September, LTCM's capital dropped further to $600 million without shrinking the portfolio.
Banks began to doubt its ability to meet margin calls. To prevent a potential systemic meltdown The dot.com bubble was a speculative stock price bubble that was built up during the mid-to late1990s. During this period, many internet-based companies, commonly referred to as "dot.coms,"
were founded. Rapidly increasing stock prices and widely available venture capital created an environment in which many of these companies seemed to focus largely on increasing market share. At the height of the boom, many dot.coms were able to go public and raise substantial amounts of money even if they had never earned any profits, and in some cases had not even earned any revenues. On March 10, 2000, the Nasdaq composite index peaked at more than double its value just a year before. After the bursting of the bubble, many dot.coms ran out of capital and were acquired or filed for bankruptcy (examples of the latter include WorldCom and Pets.com). The U.S. economy started to slow down and business investments began falling. The Step 1: Classify all bank activities as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid. For activities other than loans, information on product category and maturity are combined. Due to data limitations, loans are classified entirely by product category.
Step 2: Assign weights to the activities classified in Step 1.
ASSETS:
Illiquid assets (weight = ½) Semi-liquid assets (weight = 0) Liquid assets (weight = -½) Commercial real estate loans (CRE)
Residential 
OFF-BALANCE SHEET GUARANTEES (notional values):
Illiquid guarantees (weight = ½) Semi-liquid guarantees (weight = 0) Liquid guarantees (weight = -½) Unused commitments Net credit derivatives Net participations acquired Net standby letters of credit Net securities lent Commercial and similar letters of credit All other off-balance sheet liabilities
OFF-BALANCE SHEET DERIVATIVES (gross fair values):
Liquid derivatives (weight = -½) Interest rate derivatives Foreign exchange derivatives Equity and commodity derivatives
Step 3: Combine bank activities as classified in Step 1 and as weighted in Step 2 to construct the liquidity creation (LC) measure.
LC =
+ ½ * illiquid assets + 0 * semi-liquid assets -½ * liquid assets + ½ * liquid liabilities + 0 * semi-liquid liabilities -½ * illiquid liabilities -½ * equity + ½ * illiquid guarantees + 0 * semi-liquid guarantees -½ * liquid guarantees -½ * liquid derivatives This table examines whether abnormally high detrended liquidity creation presages a financial crisis. The data is first deseasonalized using the X11 procedure developed by the U.S. Census Bureau, and then detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter. The sample includes the normal time period quarters and the first quarter of every crisis. We drop the remaining crisis quarters because a crisis cannot start if one is already ongoing. A dummy is created that equals 1 during the first quarter of each crisis and 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the results of 19 logit regressions in which the probability of a crisis occurring is regressed on DETRENDED LC TOTAL, the dollar amount of detrended liquidity creation, and various macroeconomic factors that may affect the likelihood of a crisis: detrended GDP; monetary policy as measured by MONPOL, the federal funds rate; and MKTRETURN, the quarterly return on the stock market measured as the average monthly return during the quarter. The regressors are lagged one quarter. The first regression uses data through 2002:Q4, one quarter after the end of the fourth crisis. Each of the next 18 regressions includes one additional quarter of data. The last regression uses data through 2007:Q2, the last quarter before the start of the subprime lending crisis of the late 2000s, the last crisis in the sample. Odds ratios, i.e., exponentiated regression coefficients, are reported. t-statistics are in parentheses. Bold font denotes significance at least at the 10% level. Panel B contains the predicted probability of a crisis striking one quarter hence. This figure shows the total amount of detrended liquidity created by the banking sector (Panel A) and its on-and off-balance sheet components (Panels B and C, respectively). The data is first deseasonalized using the X11 procedure developed by the U.S. Census Bureau, and then detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) (HP) filter. To ensure that the detrended amounts are purely based on historical data, we do the following. Since the HP filter requires that at least twelve quarterly observations are used, we first detrend the initial twelve quarters in the sample period (1984:Q1-1986:Q4) . We drop the first eleven quarterly detrended amounts since they are in part based on forward-looking data. Thus, the first detrended amount in our sample is from the twelfth quarter, 1986:Q4. To obtain the detrended amount in the next quarter, we use data from 1984:Q1-1987:Q1 in our detrending process and only keep the result for 1987:Q1. We follow a similar procedure for every subsequent quarter and end up with a detrended liquidity creation series from 1986:Q4 -2008:Q4 that is based on historical data in every quarter. All dollar values are expressed in real 2008:Q4 dollars. Each panel also shows the five financial crises studied in this paper (marked with dotted lines) -the 1987 stock market crash, the credit crunch of the early 1990s, the Russian debt crisis plus LTCM bailout in 1998, the bursting of the dot.com bubble plus Sept. 11, and the subprime lending crisis of the late 2000s. 
